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Saturday, November 29, 2014

Salvador: honors for Romero assassin


Victims of political assassination in El Salvador, 1982.  Giovanni Palazzo photo, El Faro.
The mayor of San Salvador has created a stir by announcing that a historic thoroughfare in the Salvadoran capital is being renamed to honor Roberto D’Aubuisson,  a man believed to have organized rightwing death squads during El Salvador’s civil war (1980-1992) and masterminded the assassination of Archbishop Óscar A. Romero in March 1980.  Mayor Norman Quijano insists that the decision is not intended as a slight to Romero, whose beatification is widely expected within the next year, but is based on D’Aubuisson’s merits as president of the constituent assembly that drafted El Salvador’s constitution and as founder of the ARENA party that ruled El Salvador after the war.
Human Rights Ombudsman David Morales announced that he will mount a legal challenge to the action on grounds that it infringes the right to the truth, and that it flouts the recommendations of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the case of Archbishop Romero.  Morales said his office has received complaints regarding the decision.  [In the interest of full disclosure, Super Martyrio wrote the Ombudsman on the subject.]

The Salvadoran Church has also declared its disapproval. Abp. José Luis Escobar, the successor of Abp. Romero, noted that the street is now named for Saint Anthony the Abbott and that the Church considers it a lack of respect for religious sensibilities to replace the name of the saint with D'Aubuisson’s. Moreover, Escobar said the Church considers itself an “injured party” in the Romero case, the case of the Jesuits, the American churchwomen and other priests and laity killed by the death squads. Escobar compared the feeling of the Church to “when a person whose brother is killed sees the person presumed to be the material or intellectual author of the murder receive an award.”
The timing of Quijano’s announcement, coming just days after Salvadorans marked the somber 25th anniversary of the assassination of six Jesuits in El Salvador’s Catholic university and a few months shy of the 35th anniversary of the Romero assassination, have raised eyebrows and objections from activists who argue it is inappropriate to create monuments for a war criminal.  Mayor Quijano’s argument that D’Aubuisson was never convicted of any of the crimes he is accused of ring hollow to protesters who are quick to point out that D’Aubuisson and his allies blocked every effort to prosecute or investigate those atrocities.
To hazard the motives behind Quijano’s decision requires a crash course in Salvadoran politics.  First, Quijano is a bit of an Icarus figure in Salvadoran politics, having risen in a blaze of glory as San Salvador’s brazen, no holds barred mayor, and then having crashed and burned after a failed attempt to take the country’s presidency for his party.  Not long after that defeat, Quijano was dumped by ARENA in what should have been an unquestioned mayoral reelection bid.  Instead, Quijano was forced to step aside and another candidate is taking his place on the ballot early next year.  Therefore, there is a parting shot flavor to this decision, which Quijano quietly rammed through his city council—in Salvadoran elections, voters elect their municipal governments by party flag and thus the mayor and the council are always from the same party.  Chances are that Quijano is seeking to unify the party after these divisions with an appeal to the hardcore ideological bases.
D’Aubuisson had been an officer with the notorious Salvadoran Guardia Nacional, an internal military police force, and an intelligence operative believed to have been almost single handedly responsible for creating the country’s internal intelligence apparatus, including as director of the Salvadoran National Security Agency (Ansesal).  In the late 70s and early 80s, D’Aubuisson was linked to funding and organizing paramilitary death squads that evaded civilian monitoring. 
In 1993, a U.N. Truth Commission found that, “As the social conflict in El Salvador intensified … D’Aubuisson was well placed to provide a link between a very aggressive sector of Salvadorian society and the intelligence network and operations of the S-II sections of the security forces.”  The Commission concluded that D’Aubuisson actively sought to eliminate opposition to the regime through “the illegal use of force.” Prior to the Commission’s findings, D’Aubuisson had been denied a visa to enter the United States by the Reagan administration under  INA § 212(a)(28)(G)(ii), a former provision of the immigration law which made it grounds for inadmissibility into the U.S. to support politically-motivated extrajudicial killings. 
The U.N. Truth Commission also specifically concluded that, “[f]ormer Major Roberto D’Aubuisson gave the order to assassinate the Archbishop and gave precise instructions to members of his security service, acting as a ‘death squad’, to organize and supervise the assassination” of Archbishop Romero.  The findings as to Romero have been confirmed by an OAS human rights commission, a U.S. federal civil lawsuit, and numerous journalistic and scholarly investigations.
In Antiguo Cuscatlán, where the mayor is an ARENA stalwart, a roundabout (traffic circle) bears D’Aubuisson’s name and flies the party’s tricolor flag along with the national standard.  Every year, the party’s most loyal members, including multiple former presidents, visit D’Aubuisson’s grave to mark the anniversary of his death in a private ceremony.  In 2007, ARENA attempted to obtain a legislative decree granting D’Aubuisson a “Meritorious Son of the Nation” recognition.  The effort was beat back by legendary human rights activist María Julia Hernández, a Romero disciple.

[More at Tim’s El Salvador Blog.]

El Salvador: un homenaje al asesino de Romero


Víctimas de asesinatos políticos en el Salvador, 1982.  Foto de Giovanni Palazzo, El Faro.
 
El alcalde de San Salvador ha creado un gran revuelo con su anuncio de que una vía histórica en la capital salvadoreña llevará el nombre de Roberto D'Aubuisson, un hombre que se cree haber organizado escuadrones de la muerte durante la guerra civil de El Salvador (1980-1992) y ser el autor intelectual del asesinato de Mons. Óscar A. Romero en marzo de 1980. El alcalde Norman Quijano insiste que su decisión no debe interpretarse como una desestima de Romero, cuya beatificación se espera en el próximo año, y que se basa sobre los méritos de D'Aubuisson como presidente de la constituyente que redactó la constitución de El Salvador y como fundador del partido ARENA, que gobernó El Salvador después de la guerra.
El Procurador de Derechos Humanos, David Morales, anunció que va a montar un recurso legal en contra de la acción por considerar que vulnera el derecho a la verdad, y que incumple las recomendaciones de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el caso de Monseñor Romero. Morales dijo que su oficina ha recibido reclamos sobre la decisión. [En el interés de la transparencia, Súper Martyrio escribió al Procurador sobre el tema.]

La Iglesia Salvadoreña también señala su desaprobación. Mons. José Luis Escobar, el sucesor de Mons. Romero, hizo notar que la calle actualmente está nombrada por San Antonio Abad y que la Iglesia considera falta de respeto a la sensibilidad religiosa quitarle el nombre del santo y ponerle el de D’Aubuisson.  Además, Escobar dijo que la Iglesia se considera “parte ofendida” en el caso Romero, el caso de los jesuitas, las religiosas estadounidenses, y de otros sacerdotes y laicos ultimados por los escuadrones.  Escobar comparó el sentir de la Iglesia a “como cuando a una persona le matan a un hermano y quien se supone es el autor material o intelectual de ese asesinato es galardonado”.
El momento del anuncio de Quijano, sólo días después de que los salvadoreños marcaron el sombrío 25 º aniversario del asesinato de seis jesuitas en la universidad católica de El Salvador y algunos meses antes del 35 º aniversario del asesinato de Romero, ha llamado la atención y las objeciones de activistas que insisten que no es apropiado levantar monumentos para un criminal de guerra. El argumento del alcalde Quijano que D'Aubuisson nunca fue condenado de los delitos que se le imputan les suenan huecos a manifestantes que señalan que D'Aubuisson y sus aliados bloquearon todos los esfuerzos para procesar o investigar aquellas atrocidades.
Adivinar los motivos de la decisión de Quijano requiere un curso intensivo en la política salvadoreña. En primer lugar, Quijano lleva algo de un Ícaro en la política salvadoreña, habiendo ascendido en un resplandor de gloria como el hombre de acción, alcalde sin tabúes de San Salvador, y luego estrellarse tras un intento fallido de tomar la presidencia del país para su partido. No mucho después de esa derrota, Quijano fue rechazado por ARENA para lo que debería haber sido un intento por la reelección a la alcaldía incuestionable. En cambio, Quijano se vio obligado a hacerse a un lado y otro candidato está tomando su lugar en la boleta electoral a principios del próximo año. Por lo tanto, esta decisión tiene sabor a golpe de despedida, ya que Quijano la apuró silenciosamente en su consejo municipal—en las elecciones salvadoreñas, los votantes eligen a sus gobiernos municipales por bandera partidaria y por ende el alcalde y el consejo son siempre del mismo partido.  Lo más probable es que Quijano ha querido unificar el partido después de las divisiones con un tema llamativo a las bases ideológicas más pujantes.
D'Aubuisson había sido un oficial de la notorio Guardia Nacional salvadoreña, una policía militar interna, y un agente de inteligencia considerado casi únicamente responsable de crear el aparato de inteligencia interna del país, incluso como director de la Agencia Nacional de Seguridad Salvadoreña (ANSESAL). A finales de los años 70 y principios de los 80, D'Aubuisson fue vinculado a la financiación y organización de escuadrones de la muerte paramilitares que evadieron supervisión civil.
En 1993, una Comisión de la Verdad de la ONU concluyó que, “A la par de que agudizaba el conflicto social en El Salvador ... D'Aubuisson se colocó en posición privilegiada para poder vincular, a través suyo, a un sector muy agresivo de la sociedad salvadoreña con la red de inteligencia y operaciones de la S-II de las fuerzas de seguridad”. La Comisión llegó a la conclusión de que D'Aubuisson buscó activamente eliminar la oposición al régimen a través del “uso ilegal de la fuerza”. Antes de que la Comisión concluyera en este sentido, D'Aubuisson había sido negado visa para entrar a Estados Unidos por la administración Reagan bajo una disposición anterior de la ley de inmigración que declaraba motivo de inadmisibilidad a los EE.UU. el apoyar ejecuciones extrajudiciales por motivos políticos.
La Comisión de la Verdad de la ONU también concluyó específicamente que, “[e]l ex-Mayor Roberto D’Aubuisson dio la orden asesinar al Arzobispo y dio instrucciones precisas a miembros de su entorno de seguridad, actuando como ‘escuadrón de la muerte’ de organizar y supervisar la ejecución del asesinato” de monseñor Romero. Los resultados en cuanto a Romero han sido confirmados por una comisión de los derechos humanos de la OEA, un fallo civil de un tribunal federal de Estados Unidos, y numerosas investigaciones periodísticas y académicas.
En Antiguo Cuscatlán, donde la alcaldesa es una militante incondicional de ARENA, un redondel lleva el nombre de D'Aubuisson y vuela la bandera tricolor del partido junto con el pabellón nacional. Cada año, los miembros más leales del partido, entre ellos varios ex presidentes, visitan la tumba de D'Aubuisson para conmemorar el aniversario de su muerte, en una ceremonia privada. En 2007, ARENA intentó obtener un decreto legislativo concediendo a D'Aubuisson el reconocimiento de “Hijo Meritísimo” de la Nación. Ese esfuerzo fue cancelado por la legendaria activista de los derechos humanos María Julia Hernández, discípula de Romero.

Salvador: un omaggio all'assassino di Romero






Le vittime di omicidi politici in El Salvador, 1982.  Foto di Giovanni Palazzo, El Faro.


English | español | français

Il sindaco di San Salvador ha creato scalpore annunciando che una via storica della capitale salvadoregna sarà rinominata in onore di Roberto D’Aubuisson, un uomo che si ritiene di aver organizzato squadroni della morte di destra durante la guerra civile di El Salvador (1980-1992) e architettato l’assassinio di monsignor Oscar A. Romero nel marzo 1980. Il sindaco Norman Quijano insiste sul fatto che la decisione non è irrispetosa di Romero, la cui beatificazione è ampiamente previsto entro il prossimo anno, ma si basa sui meriti di D’Aubuisson come presidente della assemblea costituente che ha redatto la costituzione di El Salvador e come fondatore del partito ARENA che governò El Salvador dopo la guerra.

Il difensore civico dei diritti umani David Morales ha annunciato che avvierà  un ricorso legale all’azione per motivi che viola il diritto alla verità, e che evade le raccomandazioni della Commissione Inter-Americana sui Diritti Umani nel caso di monsignor Romero. Morales ha detto che il suo ufficio ha ricevuto denunce in merito alla decisione. [Ai fini di una completa informativa, Super Martyrio ha scritto al difensore sull’argomento.]

La Chiesa salvadoregna ha inoltre dichiarato la sua disapprovazione. Mons. José Luis Escobar, il successore di Mons. Romero, ha osservato che oggi la strada prende il nome di Sant’Antonio Abate e che la Chiesa considera una mancanza di rispetto per la sensibilità religiosa di sostituire il nome del santo con quello di D’Aubuisson. Inoltre, Escobar ha detto che la Chiesa si considera una “parte lesa” nel caso Romero, il caso dei gesuiti, le religiose americane e altri sacerdoti e laici uccisi dalle squadre della morte. Escobar ha paragonato la sensazione della Chiesa come “quando una persona il cui fratello viene ucciso vede la persona che si presume essere l’autore materiale o intellettuale dell’assassinio ricevere un premio”.

La tempistica dell’annuncio di Quijano, pochi giorni dopo salvadoregni segnato il triste 25 ° anniversario dell’assassinio di sei gesuiti in università cattolica di El Salvador e un paio di mesi prima del 35 ° anniversario dell’assassinio Romero, hanno sollevato le sopracciglia e le obiezioni da parte degli attivisti che sostengono non è opportuno creare monumenti per un criminale di guerra. La tesi del sindaco Quijano che D’Aubuisson non fu mai condannato per uno dei reati di cui è accusato suonano vuoti per i manifestanti che sono pronti a sottolineare che D’Aubuisson ei suoi alleati hanno bloccato ogni sforzo per perseguire o indagare quelle atrocità.

Per indovinare le motivazioni della decisione di Quijano richiede un corso accelerato in politica salvadoregni. In primo luogo, Quijano è un po ‘di una figura Icaro in politica salvadoregni, visto che aveva una rapida ascesa come sindaco audace e uomo d’azione a San Salvador, e quindi dopo aver drammaticamente fallito in il suo tentativo di prendere la presidenza del paese per il suo partito. Non molto tempo dopo quella sconfitta, Quijano ha stato respinto da ARENA in quello che doveva essere un tentativo assicurato, per cercare di essere eletto sindaco per il partito. Invece, Quijano è stato costretto a farsi da parte e un altro candidato sta prendendo il suo posto sulla scheda elettorale all’inizio del prossimo anno. Pertanto, c'è un senso che Quijano fornisce un colpo d’addio col questa decisione, che Quijano tranquillamente speronato attraverso il suo consiglio comunale: in elezioni salvadoregne, gli elettori eleggono i loro governi comunali per bandiera di partito e, quindi, sindaco e consiglio sono sempre del stesso partito. Probabilmente, Quijano sta cercando di unificare il partito dopo le divisioni con un appello alle dure radici ideologiche.

D’Aubuisson era stato un ufficiale con il famigerato salvadoregno Guardia Nacional, una forza di polizia militare interna, e lui era un agente di intelligence, quasi da soli responsabile della creazione di apparati di intelligence interna del paese, anche per quanto direttore della National Security Agency salvadoregna (Ansesal). Alla fine degli anni ‘70 e primi anni ‘80, D’Aubuisson era legato al finanziamento e l’organizzazione di squadroni della morte paramilitari che evasi controllo civile.

Nel 1993, una Commissione per la Verità delle Nazioni Unite ha rilevato che, “Nella misura in cuiil conflitto sociale in El Salvador intensificato ... D’Aubuisson era ben posizionato per fornire un collegamento tra un settore molto aggressivo della società salvadoregna e la rete di intelligence e le operazioni delle sezioni S-II delle forze di sicurezza”. La Commissione ha concluso che D’Aubuisson ha cercato attivamente di eliminare l’opposizione al regime attraverso “l’uso illegale della forza”. Prima delle conclusioni della Commissione, D’Aubuisson era stato negato un visto per entrare negli Stati Uniti da l’amministrazione Reagan sotto un ex disposizione della legge sull’immigrazione che ha reso causale di inammissibilità negli Stati Uniti il sostenere esecuzioni extragiudiziali politicamente motivati.

La Commissione per la Verità delle Nazioni Unite anche specificamente concluso che, “l’ex maggiore Roberto D’Aubuisson ha dato l’ordine di assassinare l’arcivescovo e ha dato precise istruzioni ai membri del suo servizio di sicurezza, che agisce come un ‘squadrone della morte’, di organizzare e supervisionare il assassinio” di monsignor Romero. Le conclusioni per quanto riguarda Romero sono stati confermati da una commissione dell’OSA dei diritti umani, una corte civile statunitense federali, e numerose indagini giornalistiche e scientifiche.

In Antiguo Cuscatlán, dove la sindaco è lealista di ARENA, una rotatoria porta il nome di D’Aubuisson e vola la bandiera tricolore del partito insieme con lo standard nazionale. Ogni anno, i membri più fedeli del partito, tra cui diversi ex presidenti, visitano la tomba di D’Aubuisson per celebrare l’anniversario della sua morte in una cerimonia privata. Nel 2007, ARENA ha cercato di ottenere un decreto legislativo per concedere D’Aubuisson un riconoscimento di “Benemerito figlio della Nazione”. Lo sforzo è stato battuto dalla leggendaria attivista per i diritti umani, María Julia Hernández, una discepolo Romero.

Thursday, November 20, 2014

Óscar Romero and “The Matrix”


Various arguments support the hypothesis that Archbishop Óscar A. Romero of El Salvador died a martyr, killed by persecutors who carried out his murder in hatred of the faith.  In an earlier post, I posited that one could show Romero’s martyrdom by crediting Romero as a “martyr of charity” along the lines of St. Lawrence of Rome or St. Maximilian Kolbe; by recognizing that Romero was killed because of his assassins’ aversion to the tenets of the Social Doctrine of the Church; and as a violent rejection of Romero’s powerful final sermon on the primacy of the Law of God.  We also can discern hatred of the faith from the National Security Doctrine (NSD) to which Romero’s killers subscribed.
The subject is somewhat dense but the argument can be aptly illustrated by reference to the world of the popular “Matrix” movies.  In “The Matrix” universe, the façade of society is in fact a computer-generated reality enforced by humanoid “Agents” who target for elimination freedom fighters and computer viruses alike because both pose threats to “The Matrix.”  The Agents are computer programs who actually have no feelings or emotions, but they are written to identify—and swiftly eradicate—those seeking to escape the system and achieve self-determination.  Similarly, paramilitary death squads answering to NSD may not have any professed feelings of antithesis towards the Christian faith, but they were indoctrinated to automatically identify proponents of the social doctrine of the church for assassination.  Accordingly, enforcers of the NSD consistently and predictably persecuted Christians.  National Security Doctrine is, so to speak, an “app” for hatred of the faith.
NSD was developed in South America and pervaded such conflicts as the “Dirty War” in Argentina, and the internal conflicts in places like Chile, Brazil, Guatemala and El Salvador.  The Brazilian General Umberto Peregrino ticked off some of the principal components of NSD ideology to include: (1) the belief that the society is mired in a “total war” that permeates and underlies a particular society (even if, like in “The Matrix,” the surface appearance seems peaceful or normal); (2) a conviction that the military must take over the conduct of all national affairs until a solution is reached (like the “Agents” in “The Matrix”); and (3) the requirement that there be an “intransigent subordination of the basic activities of the nation to its security” (ie, individual freedom comes second—if at all) [Bruneau, The Church in Brazil: The Politics of Religion, 59.]  In its ultimate manifestation, NSD seeks to supplant religion as the ultimate absolute truth.  In the words of Gen. Golbery do Couto e Silva, the father of Brazilian NSD:
To be nationalist is to be always ready to give up any doctrine, any theory, any ideology, feelings, passions, ideals and values, as soon as they appear [to be] incompatible with the supreme loyalty, which is due to the nation above everything else.  Nationalism is, must be, and cannot be other than an Absolute One in itself.
[Comblin, The Church and the National Security State, 78.]  In his book, José Comblin states that National Security Doctrine offers a society that seems on the surface to be compatible with Christian principles.  Civil and military leaders co-opt religious language and symbolism in support of the nationalist project.  Additionally, they appeal to the religious sentiments of the population and the church by offering to grant or restore certain privileges to the church, such as the right to teach religion in public schools, to censor publications that defy certain church teachings, and to implement a moral code ostensibly based on Christian moral codes but which actually serves the state’s desire to closely regulate private behavior.  But the church recognizes the offer as a manipulative ploy that would subordinate Christian faith to NSD.  Comblin, 80-84.  Moreover, the church is forced into relatively unified and vigorous opposition, by brutalities and injustice of a scale and severity that leave it no alternative but to oppose NSD.
Accordingly, the Latin American bishops at Puebla denounced the manifestations of NSD throughout the continent: “In many instances the ideologies of National Security have helped to intensify the totalitarian or authoritarian character of governments based on the use of force, leading to the abuse of power and the violation of human rights. In some instances they presume to justify their positions with a subjective profession of Christian faith.”  [Puebla (1979) Doc. No. 49.]  For his part, Archbishop Romero condemned NSD as a new form of idolatry: “The omnipotence of these national security regimes, the total disrespect they display towards individuals and their rights, the total lack of ethical consideration shown in the means that are used to achieve their ends, turn national security into an idol, which, like the god Molech, demands the daily sacrifice of many victims in its name.” [4th Pastoral Letter, at p. 21.]
The scholarship regarding the existence and nature of NSD is well established; the Church has acknowledged it; and the extent to which NSD factored into the motives for assassinating Archbishop Romero has figured prominently in the analysis of «odium fidei» (hatred of the faith) in his beatification process.  The uncontroverted evidence—confirmed by a U.N. Truth Commission report, an OAS investigation, and the findings of a U.S. federal court—is that the Romero assassination was ordered by Maj. Roberto D’Aubuisson.  In El Salvador, no one has personified the ideology of NSD more than D’Aubuisson.  Like the Agents in “The Matrix,” D’Aubuisson claimed that a secret underworld lay concealed beneath the apparent reality, which could remain undetected even to those implicated in it.  The thing is, you can be a Communist without knowing you are a communist. You don’t have to know you are a Communist,” he was quoted as saying.  D’Aubuisson picked up such ideas at international conferences put on by NSD adherents in South America, including Chile and Argentina.
Also like the Agents in “The Matrix,” D’Aubuisson targeted Christians for persecution.  Among his most frequent targets, apart from openly avowed Marxists (who were few and far between in El Salvador), were Christian Democrats, Jesuits, and adherents of Liberation Theology—all of whom are affiliated in some way with the Christian faith.  Influenced by the Bolivian dictator Gen. Hugo Banzer, D’Aubuisson’s White Warrior Union began a terror campaign in El Salvador that dropped leaflets with the ominous slogan, “Be a Patriot, Kill a Priest.”  The terror syndicate issued its infamous “War Order No. 6,” demanding that all Jesuits leave the country or face execution.  Romero’s friend Rutilio Grande was the first victim of the campaign.
Like the Agents in “The Matrix,” D’Aubuisson believed that the reality of El Salvador was a deceitful hologram concealing a “total war” that was unknown even to its instigators, but obvious to him.  NSD singled out Christians as targets for elimination and provided the justification of a necessary purge.  In short, the NSD ideology effectuated hatred of the faith.

Mons. Romero y la “Matrix”


 


Varios argumentos apoyan la hipótesis de que Mons. Óscar A. Romero de El Salvador murió un mártir, asesinado por perseguidores que lo ultimaron por odio a la fe. En un post anterior, había propuesto que se puede mostrar el martirio acreditando a Mons. Romero como un “mártir de la caridad” tal como San Lorenzo de Roma o San Maximiliano Kolbe; mediante el reconocimiento de que fue asesinado a causa de la aversión de sus asesinos a los principios de la Doctrina Social de la Iglesia; y como un rechazo violento al contundente último sermón de Romero sobre la primacía de la Ley de Dios. También podemos discernir el odio de la fe desde la Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional (DSN) de cual los asesinos de Romero eran afines.
El tema es un poco denso, pero el argumento se puede ilustrar acertadamente por referencia al mundo de las populares películas “Matrix”. En el universo “Matrix”, la fachada de la sociedad es en realidad un espejismo generado por ordenador y patrullado por “Agentes” humanoides que se dedican a eliminar tanto los virus informáticos como los luchadores por la libertad porque ambos amenazan la matriz (o “Matrix”). Los agentes son programas de ordenador que en realidad no tienen sentimientos o emoción, sino que están escritos para identificar y erradicar rápidamente aquellos que buscan escapar del sistema y la auto-determinación. Del mismo modo, los escuadrones de la muerte que responden a la DSN pueden no profesar ningún sentimiento antitético a la fe cristiana, pero estaban adoctrinados para identificar automáticamente para el asesinato a los defensores de la doctrina social de la iglesia. En consecuencia,  los ejecutores de la DSN habitualmente y predeciblemente han perseguido a los cristianos. La Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional es, por así decirlo, una “app” para el odio de la fe.
La DSN fue desarrollada en América del Sur y ha figurado en conflictos tales como la “Guerra Sucia” en Argentina, y los conflictos internos en Chile, Brasil, Guatemala y El Salvador. El general brasileño Umberto Peregrino enumeró algunos de los componentes principales de la ideología de la DSN tal como: (1) la creencia de que la sociedad está sumida en una “guerra total” que impregna y subyace aquella sociedad particular (aunque, al igual que en “Matrix”, la apariencia superficial puede parecer tranquila o normal); (2) la convicción de que los militares deben llevar la conducta de todos los asuntos nacionales hasta que se alcance una solución (al igual que los “Agentes” en “Matrix”); y (3) la necesidad de tener una “subordinación intransigente de las actividades básicas de la nación a su seguridad” (es decir, la libertad individual viene en segundo lugar, si es que cuenta en total) [BRUNEAU, The Church in Brazil: The Politics of Religion, pág. 59 .] En su última finalidad, la DSN pretende suplantar la religión como verdad absoluta. En palabras del general Golbery do Couto e Silva, el padre de la DSN brasileña:
Ser nacionalista es estar siempre dispuesto a renunciar a cualquier doctrina, cualquier teoría, cualquier ideología, sentimientos, pasiones, ideales y valores, tan pronto como aparezcan [ser] incompatibles con la lealtad suprema, que se debe a la nación por encima de todo lo demás. El nacionalismo es, debe ser, y no puede ser otra cosa que un Absoluto en sí mismo.
[COMBLIN, The Church and the National Security State, 78.] En su libro, José Comblin afirma que la Doctrina de la Seguridad Nacional ofrece una sociedad que parece a nivel de superficie ser compatible con los principios cristianos. Sus líderes civiles y militares adoptan el lenguaje y simbolismo religioso para respaldar al proyecto nacionalista. Además, apelan a los sentimientos religiosos de la población y de la iglesia ofreciendo conceder o restaurar ciertos privilegios a la iglesia, tal como el derecho a enseñar la religión en las escuelas públicas, a censurar publicaciones que desafían ciertas enseñanzas de la iglesia, y poner en práctica un código moral ostensiblemente basado en el código moral cristiano, pero que en realidad sirve el objetivo estatal de regular estrechamente la conducta privada. Pero la iglesia reconoce la oferta como una estratagema manipuladora para subordinar la fe cristiana a la DSN. COMBLIN, 80-84. Por otra parte, la iglesia se ve obligada a configurar una oposición relativamente unificada y vigorosa, debido a brutalidades e injusticias de escala y gravedad que no dejan otra alternativa que oponerse a la DSN.
Por ende, los obispos latinoamericanos en Puebla denunciaron las manifestaciones de DSN en todo el continente: “las ideologías de la seguridad nacional han contribuido a fortalecer, en muchas ocasiones, el carácter totalitario o autoritario de los regímenes de fuerza de donde se ha derivado el abuso del poder y la violación de los derechos humanos. En algunos casos pretende amparar sus actitudes con una subjetiva posesión de fe Cristiana”. [Puebla (1979) Doc. No. 49.] Por su parte, Mons. Romero condenó la DSN como una nueva forma de idolatría: “La omnipotencia de estos regímenes de seguridad nacional, el total desprecio hacia el individuo y sus derechos, la total falta de ética en los medios para lograr sus fines, hace que la seguridad nacional se convierta en un ídolo, parecido al dios Moloc, en cuyo nombre se sacrifican cotidianamente numerosas víctimas”. [Cuarta Carta Pastoral de Mons. Romero.]
Los estudios sobre la existencia y naturaleza de la DSN está bien establecidos; la Iglesia la reconoce; y el grado en que la DSN figura entre los motivos para asesinar a Mons. Romero ha sido parte importante del análisis del «odium fidei» (odio a la fe) en su proceso de beatificación. La evidencia incontrovertida—confirmada por un informe de la Comisión de la Verdad de las Naciones Unidas, una investigación de la OEA, y el fallo de un tribunal federal de Estados Unidos—establece que el asesinato de Mons. Romero fue ordenado por el Mayor Roberto D’Aubuisson.  En El Salvador, nadie ha personificado la ideología de la DSN más que D’Aubuisson. Al igual que los agentes de “Matrix”, D’Aubuisson creyó que un inframundo yacía oculto debajo de la realidad aparente, que podría no ser detectado incluso por los que estaban involucrados en él. “La cosa es que se puede ser comunista sin saber que es comunista. No hay necesidad de saber que es comunista”, se le ha citado decir. D’Aubuisson recogió esas ideas de conferencias internacionales organizadas por creyentes de la DSN en América del Sur, incluyendo en Chile y Argentina.
También al igual que los agentes de “Matrix”, D’Aubuisson señaló a los cristianos para la persecución. En sus blancos con mayor frecuencia, además de los Marxistas abiertamente declarados (que eran pocos e infrecuentes en El Salvador), estuvieron los democristianos, los jesuitas, y los partidarios de la Teología de Liberación—todos ellos afiliados de alguna manera con la fe cristiana. Influenciado por el dictador boliviano Gral. Hugo Banzer, la Unión Guerrero Blanco de D’Aubuisson lanzó una campaña de terror en El Salvador, repartiendo panfletos con el lema ominoso, “Haz Patria, Mata un Cura”. El sindicato terrorista emitió su infame “Orden de Guerra No. 6”, exigiendo que todos los jesuitas abandonaran el país a pena de ser ejecutados.  El amigo de Romero Rutilio Grande fue la primera víctima de esta vil campaña.
Al igual que los agentes de “Matrix”, D’Aubuisson creyó que la realidad de El Salvador era un holograma engañoso que ocultaba una “guerra total”, desconocida incluso a los que la instigaban, pero obvia para él. La DSN situó a los cristianos en los blancos para eliminación y siempre con la justificación de que era una purga necesaria. En pocas palabras, la ideología de la DSN efectuó el odio de la fe.

Thursday, November 06, 2014

Abp. Romero beatification story retracted





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A world renowned Jesuit theologian claimed on Thursday that Salvadoran Archbishop Óscar A. Romero would be beatified next year.  But in further developments that day, a Salvadoran Church official identified with the canonization cause denied the information and the source has retracted the story.  The vicar of the San Salvador Archdiocese, Msgr. Rafael Urrutia, has stated that while the cause continues to progress satisfactorily, there is no official announcement and no definitive result to report from Rome or San Salvador.  He also said that the beatification could well occur in 2015.  The Church is simply not ready to say it yet.
The original news was reported by Jesuit theologian Jon Sobrino, who said that Archbishop Jose Luis Escobar Alas had told priests attending meeting of the clergy on Tuesday that “during his stay in Rome, Pope Francis communicated to him that Archbishop Romero will be beatified the coming year.”  (Escobar Alas was recently in Rome for the Synod on the Family.).  On the day of the clergy’s meeting, the San Salvador Archdiocese posted a message to its Twitter account calling on the faithful to keep praying for Romero’s beatification.  The “news” posted by Fr. Sobrino was picked by national and international media.


In an interview over local Jesuit radio, Fr. Sobrino has since admitted that he did not attend the meeting of the clergy where the Archbishop made the announcement, but got the information second hand from someone who conveyed incorrect information.  In particular, Fr. Sobrino clarified that Archbishop Escobar did not speak to Pope Francis but to Archbishop Vincenzo Paglia, the postulator of the cause; and that the message conveyed was not that the beatification would definitely be in 2015 but that it would "possibly" be in 2015, which varies signaficantly from the facts he reported.


The news and retraction constitutes the second time this year that the a leaked beatification report regarding Romero turns out to be unfounded.  Earlier this year, there was fevered speculation that Archbishop Escobar was about to make a major announcement which also proved to be only hype.  Reading in between the lines this time, it appears that Archbishop Escobar made the announcement on Tuesday, but intended it to be confidential because the word from the Vatican was merely tentative.  That is, Urrutia confirmed that Escobar had made an announcement, did not deny that Escobar had received positive news in Rome, nor did the retraction come until the end of the day after the news had been broadly reported.  Meanwhile in Rome, Pope Francis has received the Nuncio to El Salvador in a private audience, which may be related to the reported developments.


Technically speaking, of course, Fr. Sobrino’s post had been in no way an official beatification announcement.  The process is still continuing in the Vatican, where theologians are reviewing a recently submitted «Positio Super Martyrio,» that lays out the case for Romero as saint.  Fr. Sobrino acknowledged that no date or other relevant details have been established.  The newsworthiness of the story stems solely from the high placed source--the Pope himself, though Fr. Sobrino has retracted that detail.


The fact that there have now been two misfires highlights the difficulty in interpreting and reporting news about such an arcane process.  Often, the news media do not understand how the beatification process works and therefore are unable to discern the details that should raise red flags in a purported beatification report.  It helps to keep in mind what a real beatification announcement looks like.  In the first place, the confirmation typically comes from Rome, from the Congregation for the Causes of Saints, when the Prefect of the Congregation meets with the Pope and delivers a beatification decree for the Pope's approval.  Usually, the approval of the beatification is announced immediately after the meeting during which the Pope approves.  In high profile cases, the news could be leaked before the meeting with the Pope.  In such cases, what would be leaked is that the theologians and cardinals have given their approval and their report will be submitted to the Pope.  Typically, the source of such leaks is the postulator of the case.  In some instances, the local bishop of the diocese from which the saint comes may reveal news that he has received from the postulator.  Anything outside of those circles, and the circumstances just described, should be suspect. 


Here, the source of the leak was a respected Jesuit scholar, therefore the news was accorded some credibility.  However, people familiar with the Salvadoran Church politics would know that Fr. Sobrino has a bit of a reputation as a maverick and an activist.  It seems to be in his character to want to promote transparency by making public what he thought was an important piece of news.  Critics might say that Fr. Sobrino demonstrated insufficient deference to the hierarchy, including the two men who would normally claim the right to make the announcement--the Archbishop of San Salvador and the Prefect of the Congregation for the Causes of Saints.  In the case of the latter, the current Prefect, Cardinal Angelo Amato has a prior history with Fr. Sobrino.  Cardinal Amato was one of the Church officials who signed a 2006 Church reprimand of Fr. Sobrino regarding the orthodoxy of his scholarship.


In fact, Fr. Sobrino has an interesting history with respect to the canonization cause.  By his own admission, Fr. Sobrino has been seen as a bit of a drag on Archbishop Romero’s cause, because of Fr. Sobrino’s reputation as a theologian who works at the outer edges.  Sobrino worked with Romero and the scope of their collaboration was investigated by the Vatican in vetting Romero’s qualifications for the sainthood (the outcome of that investigation appears to have been positive).  Additionally, Sobrino has repeated expressed reservations about canonizing Romero on the theory that the Church will so throroughly “scrub” Romero to promote him as a holy man that they will promote an inaccurate and two-dimensional understanding of his figure.  Buried in his bungled announcement was Fr. Sobrino’s declaration that he now recognizes the value and validity of canonizing Romero.  “My fear that they will beatify a watered down Archbishop Romero has disappeared,” Sobrino said in his post.  “It is more difficult to manipulate him now.”

If it had been true, the beatification announcement would have capped a 33 year process of seeking Romero's beatification after he was shot down saying mass on March 24, 1980 in San Salvador.  His death is considered to mark the beginning of a 12 year civil war in his native country, pitting a right wing military defending a feudal oligarchy against Marxist insurgents seeking to topple decades of dictatorships.  Romero served three years as Archbishop of San Salvador, the capital city, becoming a vocal critic of military rule.  The political dimensions of his acts complicated the Church's analysis of whether Romero was killed in hatred of the faith (a requirement for martyrdom), as Romero's critics maintained that he was killed because of the political views he espoused.  In finding that his assassination qualifies as a martyrdom, the Church has concluded that the views for which Romero was killed constituted the approved social doctrine of the Church, which promotes social justice and a preferential option for the poor.

The authorization of Romero's beatification after years of stagnation would have owed largely to personnel changes at the Vatican.  The approval of Romero's cause early in the pontificate of Pope Francis would fulfill a top priority of Roman Catholicism's first Latin American pontiff, who was familiar with Romero and reportedly admired his example.  Before becoming Pope, Francis told Salvadoran clerics that if he were in St. Peter's throne, “the very first thing” he would do would be to order Romero's canonization to go forward.  With the announced approval, it seems Francis has carried out his promise.  But the fast-tracking of Romero was also facilitated by the arrival of Msgr. Gerhard Ludwig Müller as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith (CDF) half a year ahead of Francis.  Müller, a friend of Liberation Theologian Gustavo Gutiérrez, also admired Romero and had been to San Salvador for Romero commemorations.  Müller sped up the process of releasing the Romero file from the archives of the CDF, where it had been bureaucratically held up for several years.

Although Romero always figured as a high profile canonization cause, and was thought to be destined for fast-tracking, it ran afould of geopolitical considerations as well as internal Church politics.  It drew the involvement of three successive popes.  St. John Paul II, who was Pope when Romero was killed, believed that the archbishop died a martyr, but he asked Salvadoran Church authorities to hold-off on initiating the canonization process until such time as it could be assured of a positive reception.  In fact, the process was not started until the late pope signed off on the timing: even though the cause “did not sit well in some Vatican dicasteries ... John Paul II, personally and in spite of this, gave his approval,” says Sobrino, who knew Romero.  According to Sobrino, it was John Paul who gave the Romero sainthood drive the greatest boost when the Pope visited and knelt at Romero's grave during the Pontiff's war time visit to El Salvador in 1983.

Romero also received worldwide notoriety as a result of a Hollywood film, financed in part by the Catholic church, which portrayed his life.  “Romero” (1989) starred Raul Julia in the title role and portrayed the archbishop as a shy and quiet man who rises to the occasion when he discovers the grave situation of injustice that his countrymen were living in.  This becomes obvious to him after a priest he knows is killed.  Romero's canonization cause was announced the year after the film was released, although, due to the civil war, the movie not allowed to be shown in El Salvador for many years.  The first leg of the canonization cause, called the diocesan phase in canon law, went smoothly, wrapping up in two years.  In 1997, the Vatican accepted the documentation from the diocesan phase, recognizing it as valid.   Since 1998, the “Roman phase” of the process has been pending.   Bishop Vincenzo Paglia, a high ranking prelate, known for his diplomatic efforts and proximity to the Sant Egidio movement, was named the postulator of the cause by Pope John Paul II.   There was talk of a quick beatification for Romero.

However, Latin American cardinals though to include the Colombian Alfonso Lopez Trujillo, raised objections that twice derailed the canonization cause and sent it for a detour to the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: first, for a study of the writings, sermons, and speeches of Archbishop Romero to ensure that they were free from doctrinal error(2000-2005) and, subsequently, for a review of Romero's pastoral actions, reportedly also requested by the same cardinals.  While some were raising objections to proceeding to canonize Romero too quickly, there were visible efforts to keep the cause moving.  Most significantly, John Paul, who had asked for the process to be instituted, also insisted that Romero's name be inserted into a Year 2000 Jubilee ceremony at the Colosseum honoring 20th century martyrs.  The following year, Bishop Paglia, the postulator of Romero's cuase, held a special congress in Italy, bringing together experts and theologians to rehabilitate and promote the figure of Romero.

In 2005, the Congregation for the Causes of Saints came very close to doing what it is doing today in authorizing Romero's beatification, but the process was short circuited by the second Latin American cardinals' objection and the unexpected death of Romero's great benefactor, Pope John Paul II.  Under the new pope, Benedict XVI, new beatifications slowed to a trickle and Romero's cause soon found itself in the back burner.  Benedict made it clear that he believed Romero's cause was worthy, and he met with Salvadoran president Antonio Saca, a former Romero altar boy, to discuss the cause's progress.  Two years later, Benedict spoke openly--and glowingly--about Romero during his first trip to Latin America.  “That Romero as a person merits beatification, I have no doubt,” Benedict told reporters aboard the Papal plane.  “Archbishop Romero was certainly an important witness of the faith, a man of great Christian virtue who worked for peace and against the dictatorship, and was assassinated while celebrating Mass. Consequently, his death was truly 'credible', a witness of faith.”

Although Benedict, of his own accord, cited Romero publically on two other occasions, his emphasis in recovering Europe's diminishing Christian identity appears to have focused pastoral energies on other projects.  The Pope himself stopped presiding over beatification ceremonies, delegating the task to the Prefect of the CDF, except for cases that fit his thematic priority, such as the beatification of English Cardinal John Henry Newman--and, of course, John Paul II.  Subsequently, the Romero beatification process stalled, apparently neglected by the competent authorities.   The Italian newspaper «La Stampa» would later refer to it as “the lost cause.”

The sea change brought about by the election of Pope Francis dramatically reorganized the priorities of the church in ways that were seen to favor Romero, beyond the obvious fact that the new Pope personally admires Romero and intervened to kick-start his beatification.  Where Pope Benedict wanted to focus on Europe, Pope Francis who came from Latin America, announced that he desired “a poor church for the poor,” which resonated with Romero's perfile.  Romero is the symbol of the Church that Pope Bergoglio wants to project to the geographical and existential peripheries,” Cardinal Andrea Cordero Lanza di Montezemolo told «La Stampa.» And Cardinal Achille Silvestrini told the same outlet that “there is an [‘identity of thinking’] between the magisterium of Pope Bergoglio and the witness of faith offered by Romero to the point of making the ultimate sacrifice, which springs from a common origin in a Church such as a the Latin American Church, which has suffered and still suffers in order to maintain its fidelity to the message of Christ.”

Having outlived the Cold War and much of the power arrangements of that era, to pass through palace intrigues of clerical factions and the preferences of three modern popes, Archbishop Romero emerges like the phoenix to be redeemed by the Church process and the memory of El Salvador's humble peasantry, who hold him in such high esteem that some who had grown impatient with the Church's process had dismissively said it was enough that Romero had already been canonized by his countrymen.  As Romero himself warned those who would take his life, “If they kill me I shall arise in the Salvadoran people.”  And he shall rise to the altars, too.  Just not on the timeframe some would wish for.